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Summary
Sports provide powerful demonstrations of cognitive stra-
tegies underlying competitive behavior [1]. Penalty shoot-
outs in football (soccer) involve direct competition between
elite players and absorb the attention of millions. The pen-
alty shootout between Germany and England in the 1990
World Cup semifinal was viewed by an estimated 46.49%
of the UK population [2]. In a penalty shootout, a goalkeeper
must defend their goal without teammate assistance while
an opposing series of kickers aim to kick the ball past
them into the net. As in many sports [3], the ball during a
penalty kick often approaches too quickly for the goal-
keeper to react to its direction of motion; instead, the goal-
keeper must guess the likely direction of the kick, and dive
in anticipation, if they are to have a chance of saving the
shot [4–6]. We examined all 361 kicks from the 37 penalty
shootouts that occurred in World Cup and Euro Cup
matches over a 36-year period from 1976 to 2012 and
show that goalkeepers displayed a clear sequential bias.
Following repeated kicks in the same direction, goal-
keepers became increasingly likely to dive in the opposite
direction on the next kick. Surprisingly, kickers failed to
exploit these goalkeeper biases. Our findings highlight
the importance of monitoring and predicting sequential
behavior in real-world competition. Penalty shootouts pit
one goalkeeper against several kickers in rapid succession.
Asymmetries in the cognitive capacities of an individual
versus a group could produce significant advantages over
opponents.Results and Discussion
Previous game-theoretic models have viewed football penalty
kicks as a zero-sum, simultaneous-move game. Analyses of
penalty kicks during match play have suggested that goal-
keepers and kickers both use a mixed strategy, randomly
choosing between left and right dives or kicks [7–9]. In this
case, the penalty kick situation resembles a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium. Crucially, this equilibrium can hold only if
both goalkeepers’ and kickers’ choices are serially indepen-
dent and uncorrelated, because any predictable pattern of
sequential behavior could be exploited by the other party.
Remarkably, choices in match-play penalty kicks were indeed
found to be random and serially independent [7, 8], even
though human attempts to ‘‘act randomly’’ are generally poor
[10, 11]. However, penalty kicks in match play are infrequent
and are generally separated by long periods of time, so serial
independence may be unsurprising.*Correspondence: e.misirlisoy.11@ucl.ac.uk (E.M.), p.haggard@ucl.ac.uk
(P.H.)In contrast, the penalty shootout is based on a series of mul-
tiple kicks taken in rapid succession, after normal match play
has failed to produce a clear winner. Each party could easily
monitor for sequential regularities in the other’s behavior and
could exploit any departure from randomness. The goalkeeper
might anticipate the direction of the kick, for example by
second-guessing the kicker’s behavioral choices [12, 13]. In
particular, sequences of human choices exhibit a ‘‘gambler’s
fallacy’’ [10, 14]. This involves the belief that in a series of
independent random binary events, such as a coin toss, the
alternative event becomes increasingly likely to occur after
progressively longer runs of one outcome. Following repeated
kicks of the ball in the same direction, a goalkeeper subject to
the gambler’s fallacy will anticipate the ball going in the oppo-
site direction on the next kick and will therefore dive accord-
ingly. Importantly, the gambler’s fallacy is not based on the
value of any single previous outcome, but on the run length
over which an outcome has already occurred. If goalkeepers
exhibit this regularity, kickers could potentially exploit it to
gain advantage. Previous game-theoretic studies mostly
considered match-play penalty kicks [7]. Although some
examined penalty shootouts [15], they focused primarily on
motivational factors predicting performance, rather than on
runs of decisions by individual players.
We examined online videos and statistics of all penalty
shootouts from FIFA World Cup and UEFA Euro Cup finals
tournaments from 1976 to 2012, comprising 361 penalty kicks
in 37 shootouts. We recorded the direction each ball was
kicked (left/right/center) and also the direction in which the
goalkeepermoved. These correspond to action selection deci-
sions by kickers and goalkeepers, respectively. Goalkeepers
remained in the center only very rarely (2.49%), and kicks to
the center were also rare (9.14%). Moreover, we had no strong
prior assumptions about sequential effects on center choices,
so we removed them, leaving a data set of 321 penalty kicks
involving clear left/right choices.
Goalkeepers were approximately equally likely to dive left or
right, showing no significant difference from 50% (46.73% left;
p = 0.27, binomial test). Similarly, kickers were equally likely to
shoot left or right (46.42% left; p = 0.22, binomial test). A chi-
square test showed no significant difference between these
proportions (p = 0.94). Importantly, goalkeepers were no
more likely to dive in the direction of the kick than would be ex-
pected by chance (53.58%; p = 0.22, binomial distribution).
This suggests that goalkeepers are indeed unable to react to
kicker behavior and endogenously choose each dive direction.
We next investigated possible exploitable regularities, by
analyzing effects of repeated ball direction across consecutive
kicks on goalkeeper behavior and determining whether goal-
keepers showed a gambler’s fallacy. We also examined
whether sequences of kick direction did indeed depend on
previous kick history. We thus measured the direction of the
kick, and of the goalkeeper’s dive, after runs of one (n = 159),
two (n = 66), or three (n = 16) consecutive kicks in the same di-
rection during a single penalty shootout. We also considered
the possibility that goalkeepers’ previous dive directions,
rather than previous kick directions, could predict future
behavior (see Figures S1 and S2 available online). However,
Figure 1. Four Consecutive Shots by Portuguese Kickers against the
English Goalkeeper during the Euro 2004 Semifinal Penalty Shootout
The Portuguese kickers are shown in red and the English goalkeeper in blue;
the green circle is the ball. All four kicks were to the left of the goal. The goal-
keeper made a rightward dive following three consecutive kicks to the left.
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or goalkeepers: kick direction was more important than dive
direction. Therefore, we present here the results based on
runs of kick directions. We used bootstrap resampling [16,
17] to compare the actual data to the same data randomly
shuffled 10,000 times. We tested whether goalkeepers and
kickers were more likely than chance to switch direction in
their behavior following long repetitions of kicks in the same
direction.
When kickers repeatedly kicked in the same direction, goal-
keepers became progressively more likely to dive in the oppo-
site direction on the next kick, confirming a gambler’s fallacy.
Figure 1 shows an example in which the goalkeeper dived to
the right after three successive kicks to the left, thus failing
to save the ball that the fourth kicker again directed to the left.
Figure 2 shows overall goalkeeper data (red line) for percent-
age of dives in the opposite direction to the last kick. This per-
centage increased monotonically as run length increased and
then crossed the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval after
three kicks in the same direction. Goalkeepers’ action choices
therefore showapattern similar to the gambler’s fallacy [10, 14].
Figure 3 indicates that kickers showed a rather different
sequential pattern. Kickers showed a trend to switch to a
new direction after a run of two kicks in the same direction
(p = 0.07). Importantly, this trend did not escalate further as
run lengths became longer: kickers were no more likely to
switch directions after a run of three than would be expected
by chance. Overall, kickers seem to show less predictable
behavioral sequences than goalkeepers, with a less obvious
gambler’s fallacy pattern. One important reason for this differ-
ence could be that the kicks in penalty shootouts are generated
by multiple agents, who act relatively independently. In
contrast, the behavioral sequence of dives is generated by
the goalkeeper alone, so that cognitive limitations on an indi-
vidual’s random generation figure prominently in his action
decisions.
The goalkeeper’s choices could arise for two reasons. They
may believe that the sequence of kick directions is genuinely
random and simply be subject to the pervasive gambler’s fal-
lacy [10, 14]. Alternatively, the goalkeeper’s behavior could
reflect a ‘‘cognitive hierarchy’’: the goalkeeper may believe
that the kickers will display a gambler’s fallacy [18], though in
fact kickers do not. In any case, goalkeepers appear to behave
nonoptimally, since theyshowasequential biasnot alignedwith
kicker behavior. The goalkeepers’ sequential biaswas not func-
tional, since thedive direction that they choseafter runs of three
repeatedkickdirectionswasnomore likely thanchance tocoin-
cide with the actual direction of the kick on that attempt (same
direction 56.25%; p = 0.79, binomial distribution).
Analyses of gambler’s fallacy assume that incrementing
runs of repeated events affect behavioral choices [19, 20].
However, other forms of serial dependence could also occur.Lagged regression offers a general framework for considering
independent contributions of multiple previous events in pre-
dicting the current state. We therefore also applied discrete-
choice regression for unbalanced panel data to our data set.
This analysis approach has been popular in econometrics
(e.g., [21]) and also in behavioral economics, including game-
theoretic analyses of tournaments [8, 15]. We investigated
whether current dive direction depended on kicking direction,
and on dive direction one to three kicks previously (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for data, analysis,
and summary output). First, we used a random-effects model,
as recommended for short panels [8, 15]. The overall model
did not provide significant evidence for serial dependence
(F6,95 = 1.63, p = 0.15), consistent with a previous report [7].
Interestingly, the partial coefficients nevertheless showed a
significant negative relation between current dive direction
and the kick direction three kicks previously (p = 0.04), after
the contribution of other events was taken into account. We
also fitted an additional model using first-difference estima-
tors; these have been preferred because they can be shown
to provide unbiased and consistent modeling that can account
for unobserved heterogeneity [22]. The overall first-difference
model was significant (p < 0.001). There was again a significant
negative effect of the kick direction three kicks before the cur-
rent dive (p = 0.03). However the goalkeeper’s behavior now
showed a negative relation to their own previous dive direction
at lags one to three (all p < 0.01). Recent studies have pointed
to additional factors that may affect penalty shootout scores
as a result of their motivational significance, notably kicking
order (first versus second kicking team in the shootout) and
difference between the two teams’ scores immediately before
each kick [15]. Adding these motivational predictors did not
change the pattern of significance for other terms in either
regression model.
Such lagged regressions do not consider effects of repeti-
tions within sequences and therefore provide a different
perspective from our runs analysis. However, the results are
in broad agreement with the runs analysis, in showing a serial
dependence on kick direction three kicks before the current
dive. They also suggest that goalkeepers may have a general
tendency to avoid repetitions in their sequential diving direc-
tion behavior, consistent with human behavior during random
sequence generation [23].
Kickers tend to use the inside of their dominant foot to make
contact with the ball during a penalty kick. This means that
right-footed and left-footed players find it easier to kick to their
left and right, respectively [7, 8]. A goalkeeper may use infor-
mation about the kicker’s ‘‘natural side’’ in deciding which
way to dive. In our data set, goalkeepers dived to the kicker’s
natural side 178 times, against 143 dives to the nonnatural side
(p = 0.06, binomial test), suggesting that this information may
be important. We therefore repeated our analyses after recod-
ing all kick directions as ‘‘natural’’ or ‘‘nonnatural’’ for that
kicker. Interestingly, this analysis showed that goalkeepers
were significantly more likely than chance to dive in the oppo-
site direction to the last kick after a run of one repeated kick di-
rection (p = 0.03) (i.e., they more likely to dive to the nonnatural
side of kicker 2 if kicker 1 had just kicked to their natural side,
and vice versa). However, goalkeepers did not use information
about natural kicking direction for longer runs. In fact, the
probability of switching dive direction relative to current kicker
preference (i.e., natural side) did not increase with run length
(see Figure S3). Goalkeepers therefore may use information
about the kicker’s preferences at the start of a run, but they
Figure 2. Percentage of Goalkeeper Dives in the
Opposite Direction to the Last Ball Direction
following Runs of One, Two, or Three Repeated
Kicks in the Same Direction
Blue bars indicate 10,000 iterations of random
data across 20 bins. Dashed black lines are
one-tailed 95% confidence intervals of the shuf-
fled distribution. Red lines indicate actual goal-
keeper data.
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over extended sequences. To do so, the goalkeeper would
need reliable information about each preceding kicker’s
preferred foot and the corresponding actual ball direction.
This information would rapidly approach memory capacity.
Instead, goalkeepers initially take kicker preference into ac-
count in choosing dive direction but thereafter simply track se-
quences of kicks to left and right. The gambler’s fallacy effect
identified in our main analysis is therefore based on accumu-
lating information about left and right ball directions without
comprehensive modeling of kicker preference.
The gambler’s fallacy is well known in both game theory and
cognitive psychology. Perruchet and colleagues link the gam-
bler’s fallacy to conscious expectancy about the likely pattern
of events [19], while others suggest that the gambler’s fallacy
arises because of a cognitive default based on sampling
without replacement [20]. Paradoxically, in simple laboratory
reaction tasks, the conscious expectancy that a long run will
shortly end seems to coexist with increasingly fast reaction
times [19]. Extending this idea to penalty shootouts, the goal-
keeper shown in Figure 1 might have dived very rapidly, and
thus had a particularly high chance of saving the fourth kick,
if the kick had in fact gone in the direction of his dive.
Previous game-theoretic studies of elite sports have not
specifically considered the gambler’s fallacy but have investi-
gated serial dependence of choices in general. In-match pen-
alty kicks did not show serial dependence [7, 8]. Kovash and
Levitt [24] found clear negative serial correlations in baseball
pitches and NFL football passes, though their data sets were
much larger than that used here. The gambler’s fallacy is
conventionally measured as increasing perceptual expec-
tancy of a novel event with increasing run length [19]. Kovash
and Levitt instead reported lag-one correlations in production
of events. Nevertheless, their data are consistent with the
broad view that the gambler’s fallacy may be an important fac-
tor limiting minimax play (i.e. an optimum strategy that mini-
mizes worst possible losses) in elite sports [7].
Since goalkeepers are carefully selected and highly trained,
one may ask why their vulnerability of regular behavioral se-
quences persists. Kickers may simply fail to detect, or other-
wise fail to exploit, the fundamental limitation in goalkeepers’
random generation, which means that the vulnerability can
continue without being penalized. Goalkeepers may not be
aware of the vulnerability, perhaps because it has not been
prioritized in selection and training. In fact, penalty shootouts
are relatively rare—our sample contained 168 matches that
could potentially have produced a penalty shootout, but only
37 were eventually settled in this way. Moreover, in-match
penalty kicks do not show regular patterns of kicking direction
[7, 8]. Therefore, the occurrence and implications of the gam-
bler’s fallacy in penalty shootouts may have gone unnoticed.The penalty shootout pits the will of one goalkeeper against
the will of many kickers. The cognitive functions of monitoring
past performance and generating novel actions are highly rele-
vant to both parties. These cognitive functions have been
extensively studied in individuals, but little is known about
how they are coordinated across individuals within a group
[25]. We suggest that the goalkeeper’s and kickers’ perfor-
mance can be understood by considering how asymmetric
competition between a single individual (the goalkeeper) and
a group of individuals (the kickers) depends on behavior-moni-
toring and behavior-generating processes. For example, goal-
keepers may have complete autobiographical memory of the
sequence of kick directions, and of their own diving behavior,
because they face every kick. In contrast, kickers have auto-
biographical memory for their own kick only and may rely on
less-direct experience for their teammates’ kicks. Kickers
may therefore fail to monitor the goalkeeper’s diving behavior.
They may then fail to detect and exploit regular patterns of
goalkeeper dives.
The goalkeeper should have a monitoring advantage over
kickers, since self-related actions and material are better re-
tained than other classes of material [26, 27]. However, goal-
keepers have the disadvantage of producing predictable
sequential behavior, due to limitations in generating random
sequences. In contrast, the group of kickers may collectively
produce a more random sequence than any single individual,
because each kicker chooses their kick direction only once.
Distributed cognition across the group of kickersmay increase
randomness. Similarly, other animals can produce stochastic
or random behavior at the group level [28, 29]. Thus, in sum-
mary, the individual goalkeeper has an advantage in the moni-
toring function but a disadvantage in random generation. The
group of kickers, in contrast, has a disadvantage inmonitoring,
but an advantage in random generation.
Game-theoretic analyses have shown the value of unpre-
dictable, mixed strategies inmany games [30], and specifically
in football penalty kicks during match play [7]. Experimental
studies confirm that departures from randomness can be
readily exploited [31, 32]. Penalty shootouts involve a unique
combination of a simple, competitive decision-making game
and a cognitive asymmetry between the individual goalkeeper
and the group of kickers. There has been relatively little
research on games in which the same individual competes
iteratively against a set of several individuals, each of whom
takes a turn, since most studies focus on two-player games.
However, cognitive hierarchy models [18] suggest that players
try to anticipate opponents’ decisions but fail to take into ac-
count the possibility that their opponents may also be doing
this as well as they are, or even better. Importantly, this stra-
tegic anticipation is known to be constrained byworkingmem-
ory capacity: the typical number of strategic thinking steps
Figure 3. Percentage of Kicker Shots in the
Opposite Direction to the Last Ball Direction
following Runs of One, Two, or Three Repeated
Kicks in the Same Direction
Blue bars indicate 10,000 iterations of random
data across 20 bins. Dashed black lines are
one-tailed 95% confidence intervals of the shuf-
fled distribution. Green lines indicate actual
kicker data.
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1921about opponents’ likely decisions is around 1.5 [18]. Our data
show that the kickers collectively lack the degree of strategic
thinking required to exploit goalkeeper behavior. Groups that
communicate freely generally reach better perceptual
decisions than isolated individuals [33], though it remains un-
clear whether the same group advantage applies in strategic,
competitive tasks involving random generation. Interestingly,
kickers in penalty shootouts typically act as a series of individ-
uals, with little intercommunication among the group during
the shootout. Better coordination of the kickers’ collective
cognitive capacities might in principle give them a strategic
advantage over the goalkeeper. Paradoxically, our results
suggest that the kickers should not monitor the goalkeeper’s
dive direction sequences. Rather, they should monitor previ-
ous kick directions and use these to simulate the goalkeeper’s
predictions, along the lines of the cognitive hierarchy model.
This is because the goalkeeper’s gamblers’ fallacy is driven
by previous kick directions. Thus, groups of kickers should
deploy a triad of advanced cognitive functions to exploit goal-
keeper bias: working memory for monitoring kick directions,
theory ofmind for estimating the goalkeeper’s likely dive direc-
tion, and communication to pool the group’s cognitive
capacities.
In the penalty shootout, both fairness and success may
depend on the balance between the individual goalkeeper’s
ability in random generation and kickers’ collective ability to
predict the goalkeeper’s intention by monitoring sequential
behavioral patterns. Our research might motivate cognitive
training in random generation for goalkeepers, and in inter-
communicative monitoring and prediction for kickers. These
could help teams better prepare for nail-biting penalty shoot-
outs in future football tournaments.
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